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The unprecedented growth of international productions and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
flows over the last two decades has led to the upsurge in scientific investigation into the 
distinctive facets of FDI. Despite the considerable amount of research undertaken, it seems that 
there is very little comprehensive economic analysis of FDI flows with respect to Indian firms. 
The present study attempts to bridge this gap by answering the following research question: what 
are the micro-level causes of FDI inflow, i.e. what are the determinants or pull factors of FDI 
inflow into Indian domestic firms? In order to analyze this question the study uses a panel data 
structure constructed over the recent 5 years, ranging from 2006 to 2010 and covering 22 sectors 
in Indian Manufacturing Industries. Adoption of Fixed and Random effects estimation procedure 
help to identify that among a set of firm-specific factors, only technological intensity, both in-
house and import along with product differentiation have negatively contributed for foreign 
investors‟ shareholding of local firms. The export performance, age, asset size and sales volume 
are among other remaining firm-specific characteristics which lack effective pulling effects in 
attracting FDI. 
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Inward FDI and Firm-specific Advantages of  
Indian Manufacturing Industries 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Firm-specific advantages, other-wise better known as monopolistic advantages or ownership 
advantages, have constituted the building blocks in the research field of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) since the mid-fifties of twentieth century [Hymer  1960]. Their influence on a firm's 
decision to engage in FDI (e.g., Dunning [1980]; Lall [1980, 1983]; Terpstra and Yu [1988]; Yu 
and Ito [1988]) and on parent firms' ownership preferences for foreign subsidiaries (e.g., 
Agarwal and Ramaswami [1992]; Erramilli and Rao [1993]; Kim and Hwang [1992]) has been 
intensively investigated both theoretically and empirically. Another, more important, stream of 
research suggests that the relevance or importance of a particular firm-specific advantage may be 
contingent upon the characteristics of host countries. Several authors, including Buckley [1990], 
Casson [1987] and Dunning [1980, 1988a], have stressed that a multinational's firm-specific 
advantages should be considered in relation to competing enterprises or in reference to the 
competitive environment in host countries. For instance, an U.S. MNC may conceivably enjoy a 
greater advantage over firms in third world countries, say India, than those in developed 
countries.   
 
However, little empirical effort has been expended to test this argument. Perhaps this is because 
these firms may find that the firm-specific advantages necessary to operate in developing 
countries are different from those operating in more-developed countries. Therefore, the present 
study investigates the contingent effect of the host locational factors on the nature of firm-
specific advantages enjoyed by foreign MNCs. It focuses on the attractiveness of domestic-
market conditions which appeal the MNCs most. 
 
Specifically, the present research paper proposes that the nature of influence of firm-specific 
advantages on the ownership levels of foreign MNCs investing in India is different from those 
investing in other countries. The paper examines certain explicit firm-specific factors, namely, 
technological intensity, product differentiation, capital intensity, degree of internalization, assets 
size of firm, sales and age that potentially represent sources of firm-specific advantages to 
MNCs. It develops hypotheses to explain how these factors influence foreign firms' subsidiary-
ownership preferences in India. The hypotheses are tested using data from Prowess database of 
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. 
 
The present paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the trends and patterns of FDI inflow 
where in the sector-wise, state-wise and country-wise analysis is made along with a brief 
investment outlook. A brief literature review finds its place in section 3 and the variables are 
defined and their due justification is provided in subsequent section of 4. The next section 5 
gives a detailed data and methodology analysis along with the analytical framework. Results, 
findings and their discussion are made in section 6. Lastly but not the least the paper ends with a 
concluding remarks.  
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2. Trends and Patterns of Inward FDI in India 
 
Inward FDI for a specific country is the direct investment by foreign companies into that 
country. The country of destination of the investment or the recipient party is referred to as the 
host country. The host country like India opens up her doors for the foreigners with an aspiration 
of gaining some potential benefits. If we look at the changing pattern of FDI trend across the 
globe during 1990-2010, we find that the developing countries are competing with the developed 
nations in terms of IFDI (Source: WIR, 2011). However the developed countries dominate over 
the developing countries in the frontier of OFDI. Among the developing countries, the Asian 
countries lead in IFDI over the Latin America and Caribbean countries and Africa. If we select a 
few but emerging economies like China, Hong Kong, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, Chile, 
Argentina, Singapore, Indonesia, the first two countries have the highest share in IFDI. India‟s 
stand is after Russia, Brazil and Singapore in terms of IFDI so far as the latest findings are 
concerned.  
 
2.1 FDI inflows to India 
 
FDI inflows grew steadily through the first half of the 90s but stagnated between 1996 and 2003 
(Table 1).The year-on-year fluctuations until 2003-04 make it difficult to identify a clear trend; 
however, inflows have been increasing continuously since 2004-05. In the year 2006-07, the 
growth in FDI inflows is the maximum. During 2008-09, India registered FDI inflows of $33.1 
billion and become more than the double in comparison to the previous year. The total 
cumulative inflows from August 1991 to March 2009 have been to the tune of $121.9 billion. 
 
Table 1 
FDI Inflows to India (1991 to 2009) 
 Amount of FDI inflows Annual Growth 
Year Rs. Crore US$ million $ value Rs. value 
1991 (Aug.-Dec.) 3,535 144 - 
 1992 6,912 264 (+)83% (+)95% 
1993 18,620 608 (+)130 % (+)169% 
1994 31,122 992 (+) 63 % (+)67% 
1995 64,854 2,065 (+)108 % (+)108% 
1996 87,522 2,545 (+) 23 % (+)34% 
1997 129,898 3,621 (+) 42 % (+)48% 
1998 132,692 3,359 (-) 07 % (+)2% 
1999  92,599 2,205 (-) 34 % (-)30% 
2000 104,411 2,428 (+) 10 % (+)12% 
2001 160,711 3,571 (+) 47 % (+)53% 
2002 161,344 3,361 (-) 59 % (+)0.39% 
2003  95,640 2,079 (-) 38 % (-)40% 
2004  147,814 3,213 (+) 55 % (+)54% 
2005 192,707 4,355 (+) 36 % (+)30% 
2006 503,573 11,119 (+)155 % (+)161% 
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2007 654,950 15,921 (+) 43 % (+)30% 
2008 1,397,255 33,029 (+) 107 % (+)113% 
2009 1,309,799 27,044 (-) 18 % (-)6% 
Cumulative total 5,295,958 121,923   
Source: Secretariat for Industrial Assistance, various FDI Fact Sheets 
 
2.1.1 Sector-wise FDI inflows 
 
Over the recent past, the sector-wise inflows of FDI have undergone a change. This is clear from 
the variation in the sector ranks based on their share in total FDI inflows. For comparison, we 
divide the period from 1991 to 2009 into two sub-periods of approximately the same length: the 
initial period of 1991 to 1999 and the second sub-period of 2000 to the latest available (i.e., 
2009). 
 
Table 2 presents the ranks, names and shares of FDI inflows for the top 20 sectors as reported in 
SIA publications. The figures are reported for the two cumulative periods and the year 2009 for 
which the latest information is available. The FDI inflows appear to be concentrated among the 
20 industries. During the initial sub-period, namely, August 1991 to December 1999, the 20 
sectors constituted 59.8 per cent of total FDI inflows, whereas during the second sub-period, 
namely, January 2000 to March 2009, these sectors constitute 79.3 per cent of the total FDI 
inflows. The emergence of the service sector is clear from a comparison of the shares over the 
two sub-periods. Other new sector entrants in the list of top five recipient sectors include 
computer software & hardware, construction activities and housing & real estate.  
 
Table 2 
Share of Top Recipient Sectors in FDI inflows to India 
 Sector ( Share as % of total Investment) 
Rank  1991 to 1999 2000 to 2009 2009 
1 Transportation Industry (8.9) Services Sector (21.2) Services Sector (21.22) 
2 
Electrical Equipment (8.0) Computer Software & Hardware 
(9.99) Housing & Real Estate (11.85) 
3 Services Sector (7.0) Telecommunications (7.1) Telecommunications (9.50) 
4 Telecommunications (6.9) Housing & Real Estate (6.1) Construction Activities (8.95) 
5 Chemicals (6.9) Construction Activities (5.7) Power (6.09) 
6 Fuels (6.3) Automobile Industry (3.9) Automobile Industry (5.03) 
7 
Food Processing Industries 
(4.1) 
Power (3.6) 
Agriculture Services (4.84) 
8 Paper and Pulp (1.5) Metallurgical Industries (3.0) Electrical Equipment (2.91) 
9 
Miscellaneous Mechanical 
Engineering (1.4) 
Petroleum & Natural Gas (2.6) 
Information & Broadcasting (2.90) 
10 Textiles (0.74) Chemicals (2.4) Computer Software & Hardware (2.64) 
11 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
(1.4) 
Cement and Gypsum Products 
(1.9) Hotel & Tourism (2.19) 
12 Trading (1.1) Ports (1.7) Trading (1.93) 
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13 Metallurgical industries (1) Trading (1.7) Metallurgical Industries (1.74) 
14 Glass (0.9) Drugs & Pharmaceuticals (1.7) Chemicals (1.69) 
15 
Commercial, Office and 
Household equipment (0.9) 
Electrical Equipment (1.6) 
Consultancy Services (1.55) 
16 
Industrial Machinery (0.6) Information & Broadcasting 
(1.5) Petroleum & Natural Gas (1.41) 
17 Rubber Goods (0.5) Hotel & Tourism (1.4) Sea Transport (1.07) 
18 Hotel & Tourism (0.5) Consultancy Services (1.4) Drugs & Pharmaceuticals (0.75) 
19 Agricultural Machinery (0.3) Food Processing Industries (0.9) Textiles (0.74) 
20 Ceramics (0.2) Electronics (0.8) Food Processing Industries (0.74) 
Source: SIA Newsletter April 2009. 
2.1.2 State-wise Distribution of FDI Inflows 
 
The state-wise trends in FDI show that the RBI‟s regional offices at Maharashtra, New Delhi, 
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat have been the largest recipients of FDI in terms of 
cumulative FDI inflows from 2000 to 2009 (Table 3). These states are either known for their 
strong industrial base (like Gujarat) or as software hubs (like Karnataka and Delhi). This could 
also be attributed to their better resources, infrastructure like roads and power, investor-friendly 
policies like single-window clearances and investment promotion schemes like special economic 
zones. However, the competition among the states to promote their own state in attracting FDI 
has led to an increasing trend in FDI in other states. 
 
Table 3 
RBI’s Region-wise Break-up of FDI Inflows to India (2000 to 2009) 
S. 
No. 
Regional Offices of  
RBI States Covered 
Share In 
Total  
FDI Inflows 
1 Mumbai Maharashtra, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu 35.87 
2 New Delhi Delhi, Part Of UP And Haryana 19.40 
3 Bangalore Karnataka 6.34 
4 Ahmedabad Gujarat 5.92 
5 Chennai Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry 5.10 
6 Hyderabad Andhra Pradesh 4.25 
7 Kolkata West Bengal, Sikkim, Andaman & Nicober Islands 1.17 
8 Jaipur Rajasthan 0.47 
9 Chandigarh` Chandigarh, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh 0.42 
10 Panaji Goa 0.39 
11 Kochi Kerala, Lakshadweep 0.30 
12 Bhopal Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh 0.18 
13 Bhubaneshwar Odisha 0.17 
14 Guwahati 
Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, Tripura 0.06 
15 Kanpur Uttar Pradesh, Uttranchal 0.05 
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16 Patna Bihar, Jharkhand 0.00 
17 Region Not Indicated 
 
19.92 
Source: SIA Newsletter April 2009. 
2.1.3 Country-wise FDI Inflows 
Among the countries heading the list of FDI inflows into India is Mauritius (Table 4). This could 
be attributed to the double taxation treaty that India has signed with Mauritius and also to the fact 
that most US investment into India is being routed through Mauritius. However, Singapore is the 
second largest investor in India followed by the US and other developed countries like the UK 
and the Netherlands, which are India‟s major trading partners. Table 4 shows the share of the top 
investing countries in India‟s FDI for the two sub-periods defined earlier. While the significance 
of Germany and Japan has declined in terms of their share in FDI inflows into India, Cyprus and 
the UAE have entered the list of top 10 investing countries during the cumulative period (2000-
2009). 
Table 4 
Share of Top Investing Countries in FDI inflows to India 
 Country-Wise Share As % of Total Investment 
Rank 1991-1999 2000-2009 2009 
1 Mauritius (21.6) Mauritius (42.8) Mauritius (42.76) 
2 U.S.A. (14.4) Singapore (11.3) Singapore (11.32) 
3 Japan (5.1) U.S.A. (5.4) U.S.A. (7.54) 
4 Germany (4) U.K. (5) Cyprus (5.93) 
5 U.K. (3.8) Cyprus (4.2) Japan (4.65) 
6 Netherlands (3.7) Netherlands (3.1) Netherlands (3.06) 
7 South Korea (3.6) Germany (2.4) U.A.E. (2.30) 
8 Singapore (2.1) France (1.5) Germany (2.20) 
9 Hong Kong (1.6) Japan (1.2) U.K. (1.73) 
10 France (1.6) Russia (1.1) France (1.10) 
Source: SIA Newsletter April 2009. 
 
2.2 Investment Outlook 
 
A number of studies in the recent past have highlighted the growing attractiveness of India as an 
investment destination. According to Goldman Sachs (2003), the Indian economy is expected to 
continue growing at the rate of 5 per cent or more until 2050. According to the A.T. Kearney 
(2007), India continues to rank as the second most attractive FDI destination, between China at 
number one and the United States at number three. India displaced the United States in 2005 to 
gain the second position, which it has held since then. FDI inflows in 2006 touched $16.8 billion 
and in 2007, total FDI inflows in India stood at $25 billion, showing a growth rate of 152 per 
cent over 2005 and 48 per cent over 2006. In 2008, total FDI inflows into India stood at ever-
highest $40.4 billion. 
 
UNCTAD ranks countries by their Inward FDI Performance and Inward FDI Potential Indices. 
While India is the second most attractive country in terms of the foreign investors‟ confidence 
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index, it does not rank high on either the performance or potential indices. UNCTAD (2010) 
provides a matrix of four groups of countries based on their FDI performance and potential 
wherein countries like Chile, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are “front runners”, 
and China is below potential, all the major South Asian countries, viz., Bangladesh, India, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka are “under-performers”. India‟s FDI Performance Index in 2010 ranked 
at 97out of 141 countries based on 12 policy and economic variables. However, it has a relatively 
high FDI Potential Index at 79. 
 
Another method of assessing the investment potential of an economy is its rank on global 
competitiveness. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) is a comprehensive index developed 
by the World Economic Forum (WEF) to measure national competitiveness and is published in 
the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). It takes into account the micro- and macro-economic 
foundations of national competitiveness, in which competitiveness is defined as the set of 
institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country and 
involves static and dynamic components. The overall GCI is the weighted average of three major 
components: a) basic requirements (BR); b) efficiency enhancers (EE); and c) innovations and 
sophistication factors (ISF). 
 
Within the information available (GCI Report,  2010) for 139 countries, Switzerland is ranked 
the highest, with an overall index of 5.63, and Chad is ranked the lowest with an overall index of 
2.73; the overall index is 107 for Bangladesh, 123 for Pakistan and 62 for Sri Lanka. The overall 
rank of India at 51 is still below that of China at 35. In terms of the components, India holds a 
relatively low rank for BR (81), but higher ranks for EE (38) and even higher for ISF (42). 
Compared to China, India‟s rank is lower in all the three components. 
 
The above mentioned facts clearly demonstrate that many countries across the globe stand taller 
than India in terms of attracting FDI to their region. However, the figures pertaining to FDI 
inflows over the last twenty years reveal the fact that India becomes an emerging economy in 
terms of destination but that is not enough. Therefore, the obvious question arises, i.e. where 
does the problem lie? So far as the economic research in this field is concerned, there is no 
dearth in it. But most of them focus on the macro-level or country-specific determinants of FDI 
inflow. There are of course a few firm-specific analyses in the literature but the present study 
shows succinctness by making a comprehensive economic analysis of FDI inflows, especially 
focusing on its firm-specific determinants, by considering a recent and updated version of data 
ranging over time and across firms.  
 
3. Firm-specific Determinants of FDI: 
 
It is not surprising that there exists no general theory that can comprehensively explain the 
existence of MNCs and FDI. As a result of this, the FDI literature is diverse and spans over 
several different disciplines including international economics, economic geography, 
international business and management. There exist several studies providing overviews of FDI 
theories, for example, Agarwal
ﬃ
 (1980) and Faeth
§
 (2009) and among others: Cantwell (1991), 
                                                          
ﬃ Agarwal (1980), distinguished thirteen different models in four categories (Hypothesis of Perfect Markets, Hypothesis based on 
Market Imperfections, Hypothesis on the Propensity to Invest and Determinants of the Inflow of FDI). 
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Meyer (2001) and Markusen (2002). Most theories of FDI have emerged during the post war 
period, when the forces of globalization began to grow. The growing importance of MNCs and 
FDI during the fifties and sixties gave an impetus to researchers to find theories able to explain 
the behaviour of MNCs and the existence of international production. This chapter presents a 
review of the different theoretical models and econometric studies in relation to FDI. Some of 
the important theoretical models and empirical studies of FDI are mentioned below. 
 
Following the seminal works such as Buckley and Casson (1976) and Dunning (1979, 1988), the 
theoretical explanation of the multinational enterprise is a function of three types of advantage 
that may be generated for the firm. First, ownership advantage; that in order to succeed in host 
markets the firm must possess some inherent advantage over the domestic competition. 
Secondly, location advantage; that by locating assets in a particular country or region, the firm is 
able to gain due to the factor endowments available in that location. Thirdly, internalization 
advantage, that FDI must be more efficient than arms-length trading. 
 
Pearce (1993) argues that ownership advantage is generated through R&D. The other firm 
specific phenomena, associated with the creation of some firm specific advantage can be seen in 
the same light. Examples of these are advertising, exploitation of economies of scale, industry 
structure and the conditions of entry. However, the relationship between entry barriers and FDI is 
somewhat ambiguous. 
 
In addition to firm specific ownership advantage, explanations of FDI are also based on location 
advantage. This concern the benefit conferred on the organization, due to its presence in a 
particular location. This is generally related to country specific phenomena, or within the 
international economics literature, the factor endowments of a particular country or region. 
However, there is an established link between agglomeration economies and FDI. While 
particular locations may be expected to confer certain advantages on the firms concerned, the 
reverse may also be true. Porter (1990) stresses the importance of spatial agglomeration in 
location theory, and the performance of certain industries and firms. High levels of regional 
concentration of industries within the UK may therefore be seen as a source of location 
advantage, beyond merely factor endowments, through agglomeration economies.  
 
The fundamental hypothesis in relation to internalisation is that FDI is in part a response to 
market failure and are characterized by asymmetric information and agency problems in general 
(Coase, 1937). Attempts to operationalize the internalization hypothesis within an econometric 
model are somewhat limited, due to the difficulty of obtaining suitable proxies. Kumar (1987, 
1990) and Pearce (1993) however link the importance of internalization directly to the existence 
of ownership advantages. As such therefore, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and to a lesser 
extent, capital intensity, are expected to be the indicators of internalization advantage as well 
ownership advantage. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
§ Faeth (2009) gave nine theoretical models: early studies of FDI, Neoclassical Trade Theory, ownership advantages, aggregate 
variables, OLI framework, horizontal, vertical FDI and Knowledge-Capital Model, diversified FDI and risk diversification model 
and policy variables as determinants of FDI. 
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4. Selection of variables: 
 
A number of firm-specific factors were mentioned and analysed as potential determinants of FDI 
inflows into India. But amongst the vast list only a few and most commonly empirically-tested 
factors are included in our study, they are: R&D intensity, advertisement intensity, intensity of 
technological imports, degree of internationalization, age, asset size and sales volume of 
domestic firms. The selection of these potential determinants for the econometric analysis is 
backed by the theories mentioned in the previous section and most importantly depends on data 
availability. It is basically focused on two things: (a) the research question and (b) the 
availability of data at hand. On this basis, the following variables are chosen which are discussed 
below. 
 
4.1 Technological Intensity: 
 
Previous research pertaining to firm-level FDI patterns has revealed a mixed correlation between 
research and development intensities of firms and the proportion of subsidiaries organized as 
sole ventures rather than joint ventures [Stopford and Wells 1972]. According to Hymer [1960], 
sole ventures are desired in order to appropriate fully the returns on certain skills and ability. 
Kindleberger [1984] added that relatively low-tech firms invite foreign promoters to open joint 
ventures in host economy in order to upgrade their technologies through assimilation. 
Additionally, concerns about loss of proprietary knowledge drive firms to open their own 
associates rather than choosing franchising or licensing as the mode of operation.  
 
Gatignon and Anderson [1988] found strong support in their study on U.S. multinationals. The 
probability of holding more equity of a firm increases with less R&D intensity but reversely 
establishing wholly owned subsidiaries increases with R&D intensity, a surrogate for 
technological intensity. Firm-level economies of scale as suggested by Brainard (1997) is an 
important factor which influence the strategic operation of firms and for which R&D intensity by 
firms is taken as the variable. Less is R&D intensity of domestic firms; more is expected in terms 
of purchasing, managerial, financial and marketing operations of foreign firms over the domestic 
players by purchasing more and more equity shares. This results in greater chance of foreign 
market operation rather than limiting itself to domestic area. Therefore, 
 
Hypothesis 1: More (less) R&D intensive is the domestic firm; less (more) is its chance 
of being open-up for foreign MNCs. 
 
4.2 Product Differentiation  
 
Product differentiation is an important firm-specific advantage that can ensure higher economic 
rent. Firms attempt to differentiate products in many ways, but an important component is 
creation of positive brand images through the use of marketing promotions including advertising. 
Empirical evidence based on advanced-country multinationals suggests that higher advertising 
intensities lead to greater use of higher-equity modes [Gatignon and Anderson 1988]. Both 
Dunning [1981] and Caves [1982] have suggested that protection of brand image is difficult if 
the firm does not fully control the subsidiary.  
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Historically, developing-country MNCs have lacked financial resources [Giddy and Young 
1982] and marketing skills [Wells 1983] needed to compete successfully and survive in 
industries. This led the other MNCs that have established strong brand-images to enter into the 
host economy [Singh &Jun (1995)]. However, firms in developing-countries have survived on 
the ability to make undifferentiated or generic products and sell them at low prices [Wells 1983]. 
The cost-leadership strategy has been pragmatic because such firms have usually produced 
mature products and entered a particular product market as a follower. But as the foreign MNCs 
invest in advertising to create brand identities, the firms produces fresh products as a leader 
rather than merely focusing on their efforts to create a low-cost advantage [Porter 1990]. While 
cost-based strategies are still important, some modicum of brand differentiation is needed to 
create and sustain competitive advantage. The latter is possible when the foreign MNCs increase 
their equity holding of domestic players. Thus,  
 
Hypothesis 2: More (less) diversified is the product of domestic firm by spending a 
larger (smaller) percentage of its sales on advertisement; less (more) are its chance of 
joint production with foreign MNCs by offering its equity to be purchased by the foreign 
promoters. 
 
4.3 Capital Intensity  
 
Using and adapting  low capital,  labour-intensive  manufacturing  technology represents  a 
major source of competitive advantage for Third-World  firms in relation  to local as well as 
multinational  competitors  in host countries  [Diaz-Alejandro  1977; Porter  1990]. Firms from 
the developing countries, such as India, however, do not fit this mould exactly. Not all Indian 
firms but many of these achieve low-cost production through mass production of standardized 
products. Such production requires large capital investment in large-scale, modern facilities. This 
is mitigated by importing the technology in terms of expenses of firms in technological know-
how, royalty fees and license fees. Many Indian firms are willing to make big capital investments 
in such technological imports to sustain in the market. 
 
If any firm does not involve itself in importing technology or at least not sufficiently, then there 
will be scarcity of abundant capital investment which will result in small-scale of production. In 
order to attain the similar level of production or even more, the firm needs to arrange sufficient 
capital investment alternatively. This alternative arrangement can be asserted by allowing the 
foreign MNCs to procure more equity holding of such domestic firms. Hence our proposition is:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Larger (smaller) is the share of sales of domestic firms spent on importing 
the technology from abroad, less (more) is its prospect of being in a joint venture with 
foreign MNCs. 
 
4.4 Internationalization  
 
Grant (1987) argued that measures of internationalization should reflect the relative size and 
strategic importance of domestic and overseas operations. Studies have adopted various 
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measures as proxies of internationalization, including: (1) ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
(Geringer et al., 1989, 2000; Grant et  al., 1988; Tallman and Li, 1996), (2) ratio of foreign assets 
to total assets, (3) number of foreign subsidiaries (Tallman and Li, 1996), (4) number of overseas 
employees to number of total employees (Kim et al., 1989), (5) number of FDI proposals and 
approvals (Delios and Beamish, 1999), and (6) entropy index weighted by foreign sales (Kim et 
al., 1993; Hitt et al., 1997). Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999) regarded each measure as a 
reflection of the different facets of internationalization. Sullivan (1994), however, speculated that 
use of different measures would lead to inconsistent results. With this concern in mind, he 
developed a single indicator of multidimensionality, which has been subsequently criticised in 
terms of lacking validity (Ramaswamy et al., 1996). 
 
Based on an incremental process view of internationalization, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) 
argued that it would be more telling to measure firms' degree of internationalization by 
examining their presence in developing countries at their initial stage of internationalization, as 
compared to the commonly-used ratio (foreign sales to total sales) adopted when  studying firms 
in developed countries. Therefore, it is wise to use the export intensity as a proxy of 
internationalization. This is because it is more likely to be the dominant vehicle of 
internationalization for the Indian firms and also appropriate for our limited database. Based on 
these findings: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Greater (restrictive) degree of internationalization leads to more (less) 
FDI inflow to the specific firm. 
 
4.5 Age 
 
The degree of foreign equity participation in a firm is a cumulative process that builds-up over 
time and is a function of its experience over the years. The age of a ﬁrm is likely to inﬂuence the 
foreign promoters‟ decision to invest in. Higher is the age, more is expected in terms of 
reputation, understanding of the market, up-gradation of skills and managerial capabilities. The 
stock of intangible assets of the ﬁrm, which is cumulative in nature, can be expected to grow 
with age. The established ﬁrms may have accumulated valuable production and business 
experience that gives them a monopolistic advantage. This factor has been tested in many past 
studies (e.g. Lall, 1983; Chen, 1983), and is expected to affect favourably the foreigners‟ 
investment decision. For calculating age, we use the formula of current year minus the 
incorporation year. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 5: More (less) experienced firm attracts more (less) FDI inflows. 
 
4.6 Firm Size and Sales 
 
Larger is the size of ﬁrms and bigger is the volume of their sales, there is a greater possibility 
that such firm can help the foreign MNCs operations by the way of fully internalising the risk 
and uncertainty associated with host location. Several beneﬁts of assets size and volume of sales 
are predicted in the literature. For example, resource base, easy access to market information, 
knowledge of procurement sources and preferential access to capital markets tend to induce the 
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foreign ﬁrms to set-up their production-base there-only. Further, as argued by Caves (1982), the 
larger the ﬁrm (in terms of sales or size or both) in the domestic market, the more proﬁtable and 
less risky would be on the part of foreign investors to venture with those firms. Several studies 
on developed country MNEs (Horst, 1972; Blomstrom & Lipsey, 1986) as well as developing 
country MNEs (Lall, 1986) found size and sales to be an important pull factors for ﬁrms. 
Therefore, the foreign participation in Indian enterprises is postulated to be positive related to 
ﬁrm size (SIZE) and sales (SALES) of the host economy. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Larger (smaller) in size and more (less) voluminous in sales are plausible 
pull-factors for more (less) FDI inflows. 
 
5. Data and Methodology:  
 
The data for the present study has been extracted from the „Prowess‟, a firm-level database from 
the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy
**
 (CMIE). Keeping in view with the availability of 
data, twenty-two Manufacturing industries are selected, the broad classification (in two-digit) of 
which is backed by National Industrial Classification (NIC), published in 2008 by the Central 
Statistical Organization (CSO). The severe distrust on the richness and authenticity of secondary 
firm-level database, whether it is CMIE that has been considered in the present study or any 
other alternatives (if available), is one of the prima-cause for excluding the services sector from 
our analysis. Only 311 firms (number of groups) across the entire manufacturing industries are 
covered in the sample base for 5 years, i.e. from 2006 to 2010. The selection of firms is 
according to the following guideline. Only those firms are selected which have foreign equity 
holding of 10% or more. However there are some missing observations on the firm-specific 
variables (mentioned above) which reduce the entire number of observations in the sample to 
1281. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
The theoretical work on the firm-specific determinants of FDI and a discussion of various factors 
affecting FDI has already been presented in the previous section. In this section, we present the 
explanatory variables in a theoretical model which looks like:  
 
( & , , , , , , )it it it it it it it itFDI f R D Adv Rolty Exp Age Size Sales                        (1) 
 
We use i to index the countries and tto index time and the rationale for including these variables 
is explained before. The econometric representation of this version: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7&it it it it it it it it itfdi R D Adv Rolty Exp Age Size Sales                         (2) 
                                                          
**
The Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) is an independent economic think-tank headquartered in Mumbai, India. 
They provide information solutions in the form of databases and research reports. It has built the largest database on the Indian 
economy and companies. Prowess is a database of large and medium Indian firms. It contains detailed information on over 
25,346 firms and detailed information on each company like; quantitative information on production, sales, consumption of raw 
material, energy, etc. Totally, the number of indicators per company is close to two thousand. Such information is usually 
available for over ten years. 
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A panel data set contains repeated observations over the same units collected over a number of 
periods. In comparison to a single cross-section or a single time series, it helps economists to 
specify and estimate more complicated and more realistic models. On the contrary, since we 
repeatedly observe the same units, it is usually no longer appropriate to assume that different 
observations are independent (i.i.d) rather it may complicate the analysis, especially when the 
models are nonlinear and dynamic in nature. 
 
An important advantage of panel data compared to time series or cross-sectional data sets is that, 
without making any restrictive assumptions, it allows not only to model or explain why 
individual units behave differently but also to model why a given unit behaves differently at 
different time periods. Let all variables be indexed by an i for the individual(i = 1,...,N)and a t for 
the time period (t = 1,...,T). In very general terms, a linear model can be specified as: 
 
it i it ity x                                 (3) 
 
where xit is a K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables, not including a constant. This 
means that the effects of a change in x are the same for all units in all periods, but that the 
average level for unit i may be different from that for unit j .The αi thus capture the effects of 
those variables that are peculiar to the i-th individual and that are constant over time. In the 
standard case, εit is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over individuals 
and time, with mean zero and variance 2 .If we treat the αi as N ﬁxed unknown parameters, the 
model in (3) is referred to as the standard ﬁxed effects model. 
 
An alternative approach assumes that the intercepts of the individuals are different but that they 
can be treated as drawings from a distribution with mean µ and variance 2  . The essential 
assumption here is that these drawings are independent of the explanatory variables in xit. This 
leads to the random effects model, where the individual effects αi are treated as random. The 
error term in this model consists of two components: (1) a time-invariant component αi and (2) a 
remainder component εit that is uncorrelated over time. It can be written as: 
 
it it i ity x                                  (4) 
where µ denotes the intercept term. (For more details see appendix A) 
 
Which model to use? 
 
The selection of model between fixed effect and random effect depends on the „true nature‟ of 
the effects αi, i.e; whether to treat the individual effects as ﬁxed or random as such decision puts 
a significant amount of difference in the estimates of the β parameters. The ﬁxed effects 
approach is conditional upon the values for αi. In contrast, the random effects approach is not 
conditional upon the individual αi but „integrates them out‟. Hausman (1978) has suggested a test 
wherein the two estimators (one from FE and another from RE) are compared. The Hausman test 
thus tests whether the ﬁxed effects and random effects estimator are signiﬁcantly different. 
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6. Results and Discussion:  
 
In an attempt to determine the factor-specific determinants of FDI, in this study the panel data 
techniques has been employed. These effects are either fixed effect or random effect. A fixed 
effect model assumes differences in intercepts across groups or time periods, whereas a random 
effect model explores differences in error variances. The Hausman specification test compares 
the fixed versus random effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are 
uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model (Hausman 1978). If correlated (H0 is 
rejected), a random effect model produces biased estimators, violating one of the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions; so a fixed effect model is preferred. Hausman's essential result is that the 
covariance of an efficient estimator with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero 
(Greene 2003). When we performed the Hausman test specification, the test recommended the 
use of fixed effects model. Table 5 however reports the relevant estimates with default and 
robust standard errors considering both the fixed effect model and random effect model. The 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix along with Hausman test is mentioned in Appendix 
B. 
 
Table 5 
Panel Data Estimates: Fixed effects and Random Effects (2006-2010) 
 
Within or Fixed Effect 
estimation with 
Default Standard Errors 
Within or Fixed Effect 
estimation with 
robust Standard Errors 
Random Effect estimation 
with Default Standard 
Errors 
 
Random Effect estimation 
with 
robust Standard Errors 
 
Variables Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic Coefficient z statistic Coefficient z statistic 
rd -.075*** -2.77 -.075* -1.70 -.026 -1.29 -.026 -0.91 
adv -.077*** -2.63 -.077 -1.32 -.039** -2.01 -.039 -1.36 
rolty -2.203** -2.27 -2.203** -2.18 .728 0.89 .728 0.49 
exp .032 0.62 .032 0.36 -.046 -1.49 -.046 -1.28 
lage .026 0.50 .026 0.27 .053*** 3.02 .053** 2.36 
lsz .011 0.63 .011 0.52 -.003 -0.21 -.003 -0.19 
ls .007 0.43 .007 0.36 .019 1.44 .019 1.39 
Constant .214 0.95 .214 0.57 .079514 1.14 .079514 0.95 
 
sigma_u .25 .2 
sigma_e .126 .126 
rho .797 .715 
 
R
2
:within 0.022 0.002 
R
2
:between 0.008 0.135 
R
2
:overall 0.007 0.099 
Notes: Here *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
fs: Foreign Share (% of equity holding by foreign promoters) 
Independent Variables: 
rd: R&D Intensity (Ratio of expenses of firms on Research and Development to total 
sales) 
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adv: Advertisement Intensity (Ratio of expenses of firms on Advertisement to total sales) 
rolty: Technology imports Intensity (Ratio of expenses of firms on royalty, technical 
knowhow fees and license fees to total sales) 
exp: export performance of firms (Ratio of value of total exports of firms to total sales) 
age: Subsistence of firms (current year-incorporation year) 
lsize: Assets size (natural logarithmic transformation of firms‟ total assets [in Rs. Lakh]) 
ls: sales volume (natural logarithmic transformation of firms‟ total sales [in Rs. Lakh]) 
 
From the result it seems that all the explanatory variables as specified in the econometric 
functions are not seen to be significant elements in attracting FDI in Indian manufacturing 
industries. For instance only three variables, namely R&D intensity, advertisement intensity and 
technology imports intensity from the fixed effects model and the age variable in addition to the 
advertisement intensity from the random effects model is seen to be significant. Other firm-
specific characteristics are found insignificant in the model. This means the idiosyncratic 
features of Indian firms do play a role, though not so promising, in attracting the foreigners to 
participate in their equity holding. 
 
The in-house R&D has a negative relationship with the decision of foreign MNCs trying to 
invest in Indian ﬁrms. The figures indicate that if the ratio of expenses of firms on Research and 
Development to total sales falls (or rises) by a single percentage, then the foreign participation in 
the same firm will increase (or decrease) by 0.075%. This indicates that the low-tech firms invite 
foreign promoters to open joint ventures in host economy in order to upgrade their technologies 
through assimilation. Besides these, as the host location becomes an attractive destination in the 
international market, competition becomes severe, and as a result, the firm-level economies of 
scale become scarce. The temptation to grab such scale influences the strategic operation of 
foreign firms. Moreover, if the domestic firm does not spend sufficiently in its R&D activities to 
support its technological competitiveness, then it attracts the foreign investors to bring with them 
a package of managerial, financial and marketing operations which will take care of the domestic 
firms‟ technological paucity and the foreigners‟ foot-hold in the host country become stronger in 
return. Besides these, the domestic firm may be scuffled between opening-up a joint venture with 
foreign MNCs or may spend on the in-house R&D.  This decision may emerge as two alternative 
means of technological up gradation. 
 
The variable „advertisement intensity‟ is also signiﬁcant and has a negative sign. The figures 
indicate that if the ratio of expenses of firms on advertisement to total sales falls (or rises) by a 
single percentage, then the foreign participation on the same firm will increase (or decrease) by 
0.077%.This indicates that those domestic firms which diversify their products on their own 
restrict the foreign MNCs to enter. On the contrary, those domestic firms which cannot diversify 
their products on their own due to lack of financial resources and marketing skills, open-up 
themselves for foreign MNCs. At least the latter enters into the host economy with a package of 
strong brand-images that mitigate the need of domestic players. Earlier studies (Siddharthan & 
Lall, 1982; Dunning, 1993) also report similar ﬁndings, namely, advertisement intensity 
negatively related to investment or growth. One possible reason for this empirical phenomenon 
could be thenature of non-price competition in an oligopolistic industry. Perhaps ﬁrms advertise 
more to counter their rivals‟ advertising. Firms do not gain by advertising but none can afford 
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not to advertise. The domestic firms have lacked financial resources and marketing skills needed 
to compete successfully and survive in industries by the way of diversification of products. This 
led the foreign MNCs to enter into the host economy by establishing strong brand-images. 
 
The figures indicate that if the ratio of expenses of firms on royalty, technical knowhow fees and 
license fees to total sales falls (or rises) by a single percentage, then the foreign participation on 
the same firm will increase (or decrease) by 2.203%. This indicates that those domestic firms 
which import the required technology to produce or improve the process of production on their 
own restrict the foreign MNCs to enter. On the contrary, the domestic firms which cannot bear 
the expenses of technological know-how, royalties‟ fees and license fees on their own, choose an 
alternative mode of arrangement, i.e. open-up themselves for foreign MNCs which bring a 
package of advanced that mitigate the need of domestic players. The negative impact of the 
technology import variable on foreigners‟ investment behaviour may be justified on the 
following grounds. The need for low-cost production through mass production of standardized 
products requires capital investment in large-scale and in modern facilities. This is mitigated by 
importing the technology in terms of expenses of firms in technological know-how, royalties‟ 
fees and license fees. Many Indian firms are willing to make big capital investments in such 
technological imports to sustain in the market. If any firm involves itself less in importing 
technology then there will be scarcity of abundant capital investment and up to date technology 
which will directly hit the scale of production. In order to attain the similar level of production or 
even more, the firm needs to arrange sufficient capital investment alternatively. This alternative 
arrangement can be asserted by allowing the foreign MNCs to procure more equity holding of 
such domestic firms. 
 
The domestic firms‟ export performance, age, size and sales figure a positive impact on FDI as 
well suggesting that an efficient environment that comes likely to attract foreign firms. However 
such variables fall short of sufficient statistical significance, which delimit their importance and 
elaborative justification of such firm-specific factors. 
 
Since the panel is short, the strength of the assumption that errors are independent across 
individuals is weaker and hence may subject to the problem of heteroscedastic. Therefore, the 
use of robust standard errors is also mentioned along with the default results. The difference can 
be witnessed in terms of dropping the variable advertising intensity from the category of 
significant factors affecting the FDI decision while considering the robust results. However the 
coefficients remain unaltered. 
 
The output from the above models also includes estimates of the standard deviations of the error 
components. The combined error can be decomposed into sigma_u and sigma_e. The sigma_u 
gives the standard deviation of the individual effect and sigma_e gives the standard deviation of 
the idiosyncratic error. If the individual-specific component of the error is dominant over the 
idiosyncratic component, then rho (ρ) will tend towards unity. The rho is indicating the intra-
class correlation of the error which is defined as follows: 





22
2
),(

 isitu uucorr
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In our findings, the intra-class correlation is higher in FE estimation (0.797) in comparison to RE 
estimation (0.715). 
R
2
is defined as the correlation between the actual and the fitted values of the dependent variable. 
In the present panel framework, R
2
is defined in three different categories which have been 
discussed as follows: 
Within R
2 
: )ˆˆ(),{(2  iitiit XXyy   
Between R
2 
: )ˆ,(2  ii Xy   
Overall R
2 
: )ˆ( ,2  iit Xy                             
(26) 
The three R
2 
measures are respectively, 0.022, 0.008 and 0.007 for the within or fixed estimator; 
0.002, 0.135 and 0.099 for the RE estimator. So the within estimator best explains the within 
variation and the within estimator has a low overall R
2
 because it neglects the individual effects. 
The small value of R
2 
does not represent a good model and is a problematic phenomenon. 
However the inclusion of some other firm-specific factors may improve the value of R
2
 but the 
data-constraint delimits further analysis. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigated the firm-specific factors enhancing the attractiveness of FDI recipient 
country and is based on a sample of 22 sectors of Indian manufacturing industries. 311 firms 
across the entire manufacturing industries are covered in the sample base for 5 years, i.e. from 
2006 to 2010. However there are some missing observations in the variables which reduce the 
entire number of observations in the sample to 1281. The database is Prowess under CMIE. This 
chapter gives a brief account for the earlier studies in this field of firm-specific variables 
affecting the foreign MNCs‟ decisions to invest. Due to unavailability of firm-level data, the 
study delimits its scope to a small number of factors. The justification is given for the reason 
because of which such variables are considered and their effects backed by the theories. After 
giving a brief description about the database and theoretical and econometric model, the chapter 
gives a detailed explanation of the methodology applied. The details about the fixed effect model 
and random effects model along with the justification for the appropriate choice of model is also 
described in it.  
 
The empirical part starts with the introduction of dependent variable (Foreign Share in % of 
equity holding by foreign promoters) and a set of independent variables (R&D intensity, 
advertisement intensity, technology imports intensity, export performance of firms, subsistence 
of firms, assets size and volume of sales). From the result it seems that all the explanatory 
variables as specified in the econometric functions are not seen to be significant elements in 
attracting FDI in Indian manufacturing industries. For instance only three variables, namely 
R&D intensity, advertisement intensity and technology imports intensity is seen to be significant. 
The in-house R&D intensity, advertisement intensity and technology import intensity have 
negative relationship with the decision of foreign MNCs that want to invest in Indian ﬁrms. 
Other firm-specific characteristics do not confirm the model. This means that the idiosyncratic 
features of Indian firms do play a role, though not so promising, in attracting the foreigners to 
participate in their equity holding. 
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Appendix A 
 
The Fixed Effects Model:  
 
The ﬁxed effects model is simply a linear regression model in which the intercept terms vary 
over the individual units i, i.e. 
 
,
2(0, )
it i it it
it
y x
where IID 
  
 
  
                           (5)
 
where it is usually assumed that all xit are independent of all εit. It can be shown that exactly the 
same estimator for β is obtained if the regression is performed in deviations from individual 
means and eventually we eliminate the individual effects αi by transforming the data, such as: 
 
,i i i iy x                                            (6) 
where 
1
i it
t
y T y  and similarly for the other variables. Consequently, we can write as: 
 
( ) ( )it i it i it iy y x x                                             (7) 
 
This is a regression model in deviations from individual means and does not include the 
individual effects αi. The transformation that produces observations in deviation from individual 
means, as in the above equation, is called the within transformation. The OLS estimator for β 
obtained from this transformed model is often called the within estimator or ﬁxed effects 
estimator. It is given by 
 
1
1 1 1 1
ˆ ( ( )( ) ) ( ( )( ).
N T N T
FE it i it i it i it i
i i i i
x x x x x x y y 
   
      
                                                           (8)
 
If it is assumed that all xit are independent of all εit, the ﬁxed effects estimator can be shown to be 
unbiased for β. If, in addition, normality of εit is imposed, ˆFE also has a normal distribution. For 
consistency and exogeneity, it is required that: 
{( ) } 0
& { } 0
it i it
it it
E x x
E x


 
                                             (9)
 
with explanatory variables independent of all errors, the N intercepts are estimated unbiasedly as 
,
ˆˆ 1,..., .i i i FEy x i N                                        (10) 
The covariance matrix for the ﬁxed effects estimator ˆFE , assuming that εit is i.i.d. across 
individuals and time with variance 2 ,is given by: 
2 1
1 1
ˆ{ } ( ( )( ) ) .
N T
FE it i it i
i i
V x x x x 

 
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                                  (11)
 
A consistent estimator for 2 is obtained as the within residual sum of squares divided by 
N(T−1).That is, 
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Under weak regularity conditions, the ﬁxed effects estimator is asymptotically normal, so that 
the usual inference procedures can be used (like t and Wald tests). 
 
Essentially, the ﬁxed effects model concentrates on differences „within‟ individuals. That is, it is 
explaining to what extent yit differs from iy and does not explain why iy is different from jy . The 
parametric assumptions about β on the other hand, impose that a change in x has the same 
(ceteris paribus) effect, whether it is a change from one period to the other or a change from one 
individual to the other.  
 
The Random Effects Model: 
 
It is a generally happening that all factors that affects the dependent variable, but has not been 
included as regressors, can be appropriately summarized by a random error term. This leads to 
the assumption that the αi are random factors, independently and identically distributed over 
individuals. Thus we write the random effects model as 
 
it it i ity x       2 (0, )itwhere IID      and 
2(0, )i IID                                  (13)
 
where i it  is treated as a composite error term consisting of two components: an individual-
speciﬁc component, which does not vary over time, and a remainder component, which is 
assumed to be uncorrelated over time. That is, all correlation of the error terms over time is 
attributed to the individual effects αi. It is assumed that αi and εit are mutually independent and 
independent of xit (for all i and t). This implies that the OLS estimator for µ and β is unbiased 
and consistent. The error components structure implies that the composite error term i it 
exhibits a particular form of autocorrelation (unless 2 = 0). Consequently, routinely computed 
standard errors for the OLS estimator are incorrect and a more efﬁcient (GLS) estimator can be 
obtained by exploiting the structure of the error covariance matrix. To derive the GLS estimator, 
ﬁrst note that for individual i all error terms can be stacked as i T i  , where 
'(1,1,...1)T  of 
dimension T and 
'
1, ....( )i i iT   . The covariance matrix of this vector is: 
2 ' 2{ }i T i T T TV I                                   (14)
 
where IT is the T -dimensional identity matrix. This can be used to derive the generalized least 
squares (GLS) estimator for the parameters. For each individual, this can be transformed as: 
2
1 2 '
2 2
[ ]T T TI
T


 

  
 
  

                        (15)
 
which can also be written as 
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Noting '
1
T T TI
T
  transforms the data in deviations from individual means and '
1
T T
T
  takes 
individual means, the GLS estimator for β can be written as: 
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where 
,
1
it
i t
x x
NT
  denotes the overall average of xit. It is easy to see that for ψ = 0 the ﬁxed 
effects estimator arises. Because ψ → 0if T →∞, it follows that the ﬁxed and random effects 
estimators are equivalent for large T. If ψ = 1, the GLS estimator is just the OLS estimator (and
 is diagonal). From the general formula for the GLS estimator it can be derived that 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )GLS B k FEI                              (18) 
where 
' 1
1 1
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B i i i i
i i
x x x x x x y y 
 
      
                      (19)
 
is the so-called between estimator for β. The matrix is a weighting matrix and is proportional to 
the inverse of the covariance matrix of ˆB . That is, the GLS estimator is a matrix-weighted 
average of the between estimator and the within estimator, where the weight depends upon the 
relative variances of the two estimators. However, since the variance components 2  and 
2
  are 
unknown in practice, therefore we can use a better alternative approach, i.e. feasible GLS 
estimator (EGLS). The resulting EGLS estimator is referred to as the random effects estimator 
for β. Under weak regularity conditions, the random effects estimator is asymptotically normal. 
Its covariance matrix is given by 
2 ' 1
1 1 1
ˆ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
N T N
RE it i it i i i
i i i
V x x x x T x x x x  

  
      
                    (20)
 
which shows that the random effects estimator is more efﬁcient than the ﬁxed effects estimator 
as long as ψ> 0. 
 
Which model to use: Fixed Effects or Random Effects? 
 
The selection of model between fixed effect and random effect depends on the „true nature‟ of 
the effects αi, i.e; whether to treat the individual effects as ﬁxed or random as such decision puts 
a significant amount of difference in the estimates of the β parameters. The ﬁxed effects 
23 
 
approach is conditional upon the values for αi. In contrast, the random effects approach is not 
conditional upon the individual αi but „integrates them out‟. The random effects model states that 
{ }it it itE Y x x 
                          (21)
 
where the fixed effects model estimates 
{ , }it it i it iE Y x x   
                         (22)
 
Here, the β coefﬁcients in these two conditional expectations are the same only if E{αi|xit}=0. 
 
Hausman (1978) has suggested a test for the null hypothesis that xit and αi are uncorrelated. The 
general idea of a Hausman test is that two estimators are compared. Let us consider the 
difference vector ˆ ˆFE RE  .To evaluate the signiﬁcance of this difference, we need its 
covariance matrix. In generalthis would require us to estimate the covariance between ˆFE  and
ˆ
RE , but because the latter estimator is efﬁcient under the null hypothesis, it can be shown that 
(under the null): 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ } { } { }FE RE FE REV V V                              (23) 
The Hausman test statistic is as: 
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) [ { } { }] ( ),H FE RE FE RE FE REV V                                (24) 
where the Vˆ denote estimates of the true covariance matrices. Under the null hypothesis, which 
implicitly says that plim ˆ ˆ( )FE RE  =0, the statistic ξH has an asymptotic Chi-squared 
distribution with K degrees of freedom, where K is the number of elements in β. The Hausman 
test thus tests whether the ﬁxed effects and random effects estimator are signiﬁcantly different. 
 
  
24 
 
APPENDIX B 
Table B.1  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
fs 1889 0.296561 0.260265 0 0.9745 
rd 1890 0.402116 0.490455 0 1 
adv 1890 0.442857 0.496855 0 1 
rolty 1890 0.003207 0.008621 0 0.108741 
ls 1772 4.925895 2.283965 -4.60517 10.65348 
lsz 1807 5.065049 1.921736 -2.99573 10.41393 
exp 1890 0.171691 0.497924 0 18.75908 
lage 1885 3.296054 0.647899 0 4.70048 
 
Table B.2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
fs rd adv rolty ls lsz exp lage 
         fs 1 
       rd 0.163 1 
      adv 0.0355 0.0461 1 
     rolty 0.2193 0.2082 0.0636 1 
    ls 0.2435 0.4297 0.125 0.1806 1 
   lsz 0.2068 0.4039 0.0787 0.1437 0.8882 1 
  exp -0.0607 0.01 -0.0497 -0.053 0.0473 0.0964 1 
 lage 0.1733 0.3327 0.0324 0.1219 0.2445 0.2459 -0.0861 1 
 
 
Table B.3 
Hausman Test 
 Coefficients   
 (b) FE (B) RE (b-B) Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
S.E. 
rd -0.0754566 -0.02562 -0.04984 0.0186 
adv -0.0774232 -0.039 -0.03842 0.022245 
rolty -2.203159 0.727965 -2.93112 0.518571 
ls 0.0073909 0.019001 -0.01161 0.011345 
lsz 0.011109 -0.00272 0.013831 0.011853 
lage 0.0261023 0.053045 -0.02694 0.049615 
exp 0.0318046 -0.04632 0.078125 0.040433 
b  =  consistent  under  Ho  and  Ha;  obtained  from  xtreg B  =  inconsistent  under  Ha,  efficient  under  Ho;  
obtained  from  xtreg Test: Ho: difference  in  coefficients  not  systematic chi2(7)  =  (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-
1)](b-B) = 74.03 Prob>chi2  =0.000  
25 
 
APPENDIX C 
NIC Division Industries 
Division 10  Manufacture of food products  
Division 11  Manufacture of beverages  
Division 12  Manufacture of tobacco products  
Division 13  Manufacture of textiles  
Division 14  Manufacture of wearing apparel 
Division 15  Manufacture of leather and related products  
Division 16  Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of        
straw and plaiting materials  
Division 17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  
Division 18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
Division 19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  
Division 20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  
Division 21  Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products  
Division 22  Manufacture of rubber and plastics products  
Division 23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  
Division 24  Manufacture of basic metals  
Division 25  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  
Division 26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  
Division 27  Manufacture of electrical equipment 
Division 28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment  
Division 29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  
Division 30  Manufacture of other transport equipment 
Division 31  Manufacture of furniture 
Division 32  Other manufacturing 
 
